I am offering an advanced ethics class next semester. Here's the book I plan to use; the course will have a philosophical research project as its main focus:
A Companion to Applied Ethics
Edited by: R.G. Frey and Christopher Heath Wellman (Washington University in St. Louis)
"The Companion to Applied Ethics offers accessible essays by many of the leading writers in the field. It is a superb introduction to applied ethics for students and the interested reader alike." <...
Applied or practical ethics is perhaps the largest growth area in philosophy today, and many issues in moral, social, and political life have come under philosophical scrutiny in recent years. Taken together, the essays in this volume - including two overview essays on theories of ethics and the nature of applied ethics - provide a state-of-the-art account of the most pressing moral questions facing us today.
Provides a comprehensive guide to many of the most significant problems of practical ethics.
Offers state-of-the-art accounts of issues in medical, environmental, legal, social, and business ethics.
Written by major philosophers presently engaged with these complex and profound ethical issues.
Notes on Contributors. Preface. 1. The Nature of Applied Ethics: Tom L. Beauchamp 2. Theories of Ethics Stephen: L. Darwall 3. Property Rights and Welfare Redistribution: Jeremy Waldron 4. Civil Disobedience and the Duty to Obey the Law: A. John Simmons 5. Capitalism and Marxism: Richard W. Miller 6. State Punishment and the Death Penalty: David Dolinko 7. Racism: Michele Moody-Adams 8. Sexism: Ann E. Cudd and Leslie E. Jones 9. Affirmative Action: Bernard Boxill and Jan Boxill 10. The Legal Enforcement of Morality: Larry Alexander 11. Hate Crimes, Literature, and Speech: L. W. Sumner 12. Pornography and Censorship: Lori Gruen 13. Dirty Hands: Gerald F. Gaus 14. Sexual Ethics: Alan H. Goldman 15. Gun Control: Lance Stell 16. Citizenship: Wayne Norman and Will Kymlicka 17. Immigration: Michael Blake 18. World Hunger: Hugh LaFollette 19. War and Terrorism: C. A. J. Coady 20. Nationalism and Secession: Christopher Heath Wellman 21. Intergenerational Justice: Clark Wolf 22. Bioethics: Margaret P. Battin 23. Abortion: Margaret Olivia Little 24. Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide: Michael Tooley 25. Reproductive Technology: John D. Arras 26. Genetic Engineering: Dan W. Brock 27. Surrogate Motherhood: Rosemarie Tong 28. Cloning: John Harris 29. Allocation of Medical Resources: H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. and Ana Smith Iltis 30. Experimentation on Human Subjects: Patrick Boleyn-Fitzgerald 31. Disability: Leslie Pickering Francis 32. Moral Status: Mary Anne Warren 33. Killing and Letting Die: Alastair Norcross 34. The Doctrine of Double Effect: R. G. Frey 35. Bad Samaritans, Acts and Omissions: Patricia Smith 36. Moral Dilemmas: N. Ann Davis 37. Education: Amy Gutmann 38. Personal Relationships: Lawrence A. Blum 39. Animals: Jeff McMahan 40. Business Ethics: Patricia H. Werhane and R. Edward Freeman 41. Corporate Responsibility: R. Edward Freeman and Patricia H. Werhane 42. Whistle-blowing: Terrance McConnell 43. Professional Ethics: David Luban 44. Media Ethics: Judith Lichtenberg 45. Computer Ethics: Deborah G. Johnson 46. Engineering Ethics: Michael S. Pritchard 47. Environmental Ethics: Andrew Light 48. Values in Nature: Dale Jamieson 49. The Tragedy of the Commons: David Schmidtz and Elizabeth Willott 50. Global Warming: Robert Hood
Your final papers were quite good. I ask for the benefit of other students in this course that, if you'd like, you post your paper on this blog as a comment. You can keep your name on it if you'd like or post it without your name, if you'd prefer. But this will allow others students to read your thoughts and, especially, your evaluation of Pinn's arguments.
You were given a paper assignment yesterday, so please start work on that.
Monday: Readings by Pascal on "Pascal's Wager" and reply by Blackburn. Both in Cahn. Since some of Pinn's arguments were "pragmatic" arguments, they are somewhat similar to Pacal's.
Wednesday: No class due to Thanksgiving.
Monday and Wednesday: I'd like us to talk about some articles about hell, i.e., the question of whether an all-knowing, all-powerful, all good being could send anyone to Hell, as traditionally understood. I'll post these online and/or give you photocopies.
We might also talk about a short article from Cahn that presents this argument:
1. If God exists and it is important that people believe that God exists, then nearly everyone would firmly believe that there is a God. 2. But not nearly everyone firmly believes there is a God. 3. So probably either God does not exist or it's not important that people believe that God exists.
1. Develop a general argument for non-existence of God from the existence of certain kinds of evils. This version of the argument should be the strongest version you can develop.
2. Present Pinn's version of the argument from evil: explain what kind of evils he claims are evidence to rethink the nature and existence of God and why he thinks this.
3. Present at least five responses to this argument from evil, i.e., responses to try to explain why this (or these) argument(s) from evil is (or are) not sound. At leastthree of these responses should be ones that Pinn discusses (and should be, in your view, the strongest responses that Pinn discusses). Some of these responses are theodices.
4. Explain whether any, or all, of these responses are successful and why. Fully explain and defend your views from possible objections. So, you must raise objections that someone who disagreed with you would raise and respond to them, trying to explain why the objection does not show that your view is mistaken.
5. Explain whether any of the objections raised by the two reviewers of Pinn’s book are strong or not.
So, overall, you should explain what difference, if any, the recognition of various kinds of evils -- especially those resulting from slavery, racism, etc. -- should make to one's belief that God exists or does not exist (and/or what God is like, what his nature and abilities are), from a rational or intellectual point of view.
You essays should be organized and structured so as to ensure that you address all the issues above. You should be thorough and explain everything fully: assume that your reader is not at all familiar with these issues. Your paper should be free of grammatical and spelling errors. It should be word processed, double spaced, and stapled.
Friday, November 7, 2008
Today we discussed Ch. 1 of Pinn's book. Ch 2 is for Monday, Ch. 3 for Wednesday.
We also started reading this article; please read the rest over the weekend:
Teaching Hurricane Katrina: Understanding Divine Racism and Theodicy
Stephen C. Ferguson II North Carolina A & T State University
Pinn seems to be addressing two logically distinct sets of questions. They are distinct in that answers to one set have no implications for the other (or if they do they connection is not at all obvious). It’s not clear whether Pinn realizes this.[1]
Here is a first set:
“Does the Christian message say anything liberating to a suffering humanity?
Does theological conversation . . make a positive differing in the way the oppressed responding to their existential plight?
Do Christian explanations of human suffering make a ‘material’ and concrete difference?” (p. 10).
These questions are not philosophical questions. They are (once the meaning of the terms is set) empirical questions that would, ideally, be answered by social science. They concern the psychological and social consequences of holding some beliefs, Christian belief, in particular: what kind of practical and psychological consequences do Christian beliefs have on people in terms of how they respond to whatever “existential” plights they are in? Do such beliefs better typically enable people to “cope” or not, compared to alternative beliefs? Do such beliefs tend to lead to flourishing, or to despair? We might call these kinds of questions about beliefs “pragmatic” questions, keeping in mind that they are empirical questions.
Pinn also is concerned with what sorts of beliefs would better (or best) contribute to human “liberation” (p. 11), which is a state of (among other things) psychological, physical, political, economic, existential, etc. well-being (“Liberation entails … the attainment of extended life options and a better developed sense of healthy human worth” (p. 13). One might say, “I have been liberated” or “I have achieved liberation,” and be saying that one doing well, in profound ways.
It appears that Pinn will argue that some kinds of Christian belief often do not lead to “liberation” for those who believe them: in fact, they preclude or detract from such liberation when they encourage complacency and acceptance of non-liberation, e.g., accepting being a slave, accepting racism and discrimination, being taken advantage of, having low expectations for life, accepting dismal conditions, etc. because one thinks that one’s religion condones or requires those attitudes. Whether Christianity often has these consequences again is a question in the psychology or sociology of religion; it requires empirical study.
A second set of questions Pinn asks are purely philosophical and concern what is traditionally called the philosophical “problem of evil” (p. 13). For this reason, we will call these questions about how to respond to the philosophical problem of evil. These questions include the following:
·Does the existence of certain kinds of evils – in particular, evils associated with slavery and racism and its fallout – “contradict” the existence of an all-knowing, all-powerful, all good being, such a God? (Pinn uses the word “contradiction,” [p. 13] but this is likely to strong of a term).
·Is there a “tension” (p. 10) between such evils and believing that God exists? Does the existence of such evils provide evidence that there is not a God?
·Is this argument sound or not? “If God exists, then there probably would not be slavery, racism and similar evils. But there are such evils, so probably God does not exist.”
·What, if anything, would (morally) justify God in permitting the evils of slavery, racism, discrimination, lynchings, etc.?
Answers to this last question are attempts at offering a “theodicy” (p. 13). A theodicy is an attempt to show that the problem of evil is really not a problem, or show why arguments for God’s non-existence from the existence of some kinds of evils is unsound. A theodicy is a proposed explanation for why God would allow some evil, given that – as an all-good, all-knowing, and all-powerful being – He would apparently be able to prevent the evil and want to, since a good being is opposed to the existence of at least certain kinds of evils, say evils that don’t contribute to greater goods, are not necessary for greater goods, produce greater goods but ones that could be achieved without evils of that magnitude, etc.
(Pinn seems to think the problem of evil and theodicy are the same thing [p. 10; p. 13], but they are not. He also might think the pragmatic questions above are intimately related to the philosophical problem of evil, which they are not).
Some responses to the argument of evil include (pp. 14):
(a)claiming that there is no evil,
(b)that God cannot do anything about it (thus denying or restricting omnipotence and omniscience),
(c)and that God is not good, so does not care to do anything about it (thus denying or reinterpreting ,
(d)claiming that various goods (e.g., free will, “soul making,” etc.) require the existence of some evil or invariably result in some evil (whether they would require the existence of evils like slavery and racism is surely controversial!) and
(e)thinking that there is no God.
Pinn claims that African-Americans (esp. theologians) often respond to the philosophical problem of evil by claiming (p. 15):
(f)suffering /evil can have “redemptive” consequences (questions: does all suffering and evil have such redemptive consequences? Can these kinds of “redemption” be achieved in other ways without as great of evils?)
a.e.g., Pinn notes that some claim that suffering prepares Black people for “ultimate freedom” (p. 16). But couldn’t they be prepared for this without so much evil? And maybe “ultimate freedom” isn’t so important anyway!? After all, lots of people don’t suffer so much! Will they really miss out on “ultimate freedom,” whatever that is?
b.Other kinds of redemption include “pedagogical lessons such as the correction of character flaws, obtainment of .. skills and talents, and some good which God will make clear in the future” (p. 16).
c.LONG LIST OF “GREATER GOODS” HERE offered by AA’s to explain why God might allow slavery, racism, etc. This book will review these candidate theodicies.
i.Bishopp Henry McNeal Turner proposes that slavery was justified to introduce Africans to Christianity.MLK argues that undeserved suffering is justified because it will contribute to the end of such suffering (p. 17).
(g)God and humans have to work together to lessen evils (comment: this does not address the argument from evil!); God just “persuades”. This is basically to deny God’s power.
(h)God may be a racist and so that’s why blacks suffer more than non-blacks. (comment: this is to claim that God is not good, at least not good to blacks.).
Pinn does not like redemptive suffering theodicies (p. 17). But the reason why he find them “unacceptable” is going to be odd, it appears. He says that he finds them unacceptable because of their pragmatic consequences! He thinks that if you find (instrumental) value in suffering – think that such suffering does lead to greater goods and is necessary for these greater goods – then you will likely be complacent and not work for “liberation.” He thinks that’s a bad thing (and it is!) and so seems to think you should reject redemptive suffering theodices.
This response is odd because whether a claim is true or not (e.g., “evils are justified by greater goods or not”) and whether there is good evidence for a claim has nothing to do with the psychological, emotional, sociological, existential effects it has on people who believe it. E.g., some people claim to find the claims of evolutionary theory to be depressing because, they claim they would feel awful if they weren’t specially created by God 5000 years ago. They might feel that way, but that has no bearing on whether evolutionary theory is true and whether there is good evidence for it.
So, in general, questions about the pragmatic consequences of a belief and its truth value and the quality of the evidence for it are distinct. This has been clear ever since Pascal’s wager, if not sooner. So it’s odd that Pinn responds to the issues in the way he’s going to. Redemptive suffering theodices might be depressing for some in that they somehow reinforce complacency (or they might not!), but they might tell the truth about what justifies various evils.
In the end, Pinn will advocate for Black Humanism. It seems clear he will advocate for it on the basis of its pragmatic effects. Whether he will claim there is good evidence for it, especially for kinds of Humanism that claim God does not exist (atheism) or that we have insufficient evidence to reasonably believe there’s a God or should suspend judgment (skepticism or agnosticism), we will see.
[1] Footnote 1 suggests that he does, since he says he’s unsure whether “theodicy” is the proper term to for his pragmatic / psychological / social questions. Since theodicy is obviously the incorrect term here, at least given the traditional use of that term, it’s unclear why Pinn is hesitant or why he uses the term in the first place.
This last week we have been discussing arguments against God's existence from evil. The assigned readings (and OPS assignments) include Hick, Nagel and Swinburne, but we haven't talked about the details of what they have to say. This "Tale of 12 Officers" has also been distributed in class and we read it Friday: http://www.vuletic.com/hume/at/12.html
The arguments discussed so far include the following:
The WEAK ARGUMENT from Evil:
1. If God exists, then there would be no evil whatsover, nothing bad at all, not one instance of pain, suffering, injustice, wrongdoing, etc, ever. 2. But there is some evil, some things bad, some instances of pain, suffering, injustice, wrongdoing, etc. 3. Therefore, God does not exist.
While (2) is certainly true, this argument is weak because premise (1) seems highly doubtful: an all-knowing, all good-being, all powerful being could (easily) have good reason for allowing some evil or badness. For example, some kinds of personal growth and development seem to depend on overcoming challenges and obstacles, working through struggles that are or involve feelings that are bad when considered in themselves. Also, perhaps an fairly regularly ordered world would have to result in, at least, an occasional stubbed toe and whatnot. (We also wound up thinking about whether accepting (1) would lead you to think that you should plug into The Experience Machine.)
This Weak Argument is sometimes called The Logical Argument from Evil, which attempts to show that God and the existence of any evil or badness are logically incompatible. Almost nobody finds this argument to have any strength any more, if anyone ever did.
This leads us to The More Challenging Argument, also sometimes call The Evidential Argument from Evil because it claims that the existence of certain kinds of evils provide evidence that there is not a God (or perhaps that certain kinds of evils are logically incompatible with God's existence, not just the fact that there is some evil of some kind):
4. If there is a God, then there is no evil that is unjustified or pointless or gratuitous, i.e., badness, pain, suffering, etc. that does not serve a greater good and for which this good could not have been brought about without that particular evil. 5. But there are some unjustified or pointless or gratuitous evils, i.e., badness, pain, suffering, etc. that do not serve a greater good and/orfor which this good could have been brought about without that particular evil. (e.g., Holocaust, slavery, Middle Passage, child rape, torture, etc.) 6. Therefore, there is not a God.
Theists tend to accept premise (4). They accept it because they see what an all-good, all-powerful, all-knowing being would seem to have to do: any being having these attributes would seem to be subject to certain kinds of obligations, imposed by his own nature and abilities.
The challenge then is premise (5). At this point our main concern is trying to figure out what sort of evidence can be given for it, what can be given against it and what sort of replies could be given to each initial case.
You will be asked to provide answers to a select few of these questions and prompts.
Basic concepts of arguments and logic: what is an argument? What is it for an argument to be valid? What is it for an argument to be sound?
What is Clifford’s (and Stair’s) thesis about what we, intellectually, ought to believe or when we are within our “logical rights” in believing something? Are they correct? Why or why not?
What is the basic, traditional monotheistic conception of God?
God and Goodness: what is it for a being or person to be (morally) good? Explain the two options Rachels (and Plato) present. Which option is preferable when thinking about God? Why?
God's Omnipotence: what is it for a being to be omnipotent? Arguably there are things an omnipotent being cannot do: what are these things? Can an omnipotent being create a stone so heavy he cannot lift it? Explain Mavrodes response to the question. Is he right? Why or why not?
Related to omnipotence and other divine attributes:
What is it for something to be possible, a claim that’s possibly true or a possibly existing being? Explain the different sense of possibility and impossibility: logically possible, physically possible, etc.
What is it for something to be necessary, a necessary truth or necessary existence? Explain the different sense of possibility and impossibility: logically possible, physically possible, etc.
Foreknowledge and free will: Present an argument for the view that God’s foreknowledge (what is this?) and human free will are incompatible (explain what it is for two things to be incompatible). Is this argument sound? Explain at least two responses for why it is not sound. Evaluate those responses.
Can God change? Present some of the arguments given to think that God cannot change. Evaluate those arguments. (Hasker)
Minas argues that God could not forgive. What are here arguments? Is she correct?
Rachels argues that being a moral agent and someone who worships God are incompatible. What are his reasons? Is he correct? Explain.
Cosmological arguments: what are Aquinas’s Five Ways of proving God’s existence? Explain the possible objections to, at least, the arguments from motion and efficient cause. These were raised by Hick.
Cosmological arguments: Taylor suggests the Principle of Sufficient Reason. What is this principle? What is his argument from the Principle of Sufficient Reason to the conclusion that God exists? Is his argument sound?
Design / teleological arguments: Present a version of the argument from design either as an argument from analogy or as an inference to the best explanation. Present these arguments’ possible weaknesses or prominent reasons to doubt that these arguments provide adequate support for their conclusions.
Tuesday, October 7, 2008
Hi, It seems to me like this version of Hume is a killer. Try to get what you can out of it, to find a comprehensible section or so. But make sure you read pp. 329-331 on teleological arguments.
A far more accessible version of Hume's text is available here; this version is actually a pleasure to read: http://www.earlymoderntexts.com
Design arguments are empirical arguments for God�s existence. These arguments typically, though not always, proceed by identifying various empirical features of the world that constitute evidence of intelligent design and inferring God�s existence as the best explanation for these features. Since the concepts of design and purpose are closely related, design arguments are also known as �teleological arguments,� which incorporates �telos,� the Greek word for �goal� or �purpose.� Design arguments, then, typically consist of (1) a premise that asserts that the material universe exhibits some empirical property F; (2) a premise (or sub-argument) that asserts (or concludes) that F is persuasive evidence of intelligent design or purpose; and (3) a premise (or sub-argument) that asserts (or concludes) that the best or most probable explanation for the fact that the material universe exhibits F is that there exists an intelligent designer who intentionally brought it about that the material universe exists and exhibits F. There are a number of classic and contemporary versions of the argument: (1) Aquinas�s �fifth way�; (2) the argument from simple analogy; (3) Paley�s watchmaker argument; (4) the argument from guided evolution; (5) the argument from irreducible biochemical complexity; (6) the argument from biological information; and (7) the fine-tuning argument.
Table of Contents (Clicking on the links below will take you to those parts of this article)
Hi, As mentioned in class, we should have an exam. And it should be Friday Oct 17 in class. I will post a study guide with questions later tonight, but the topics are everything we have covered which includes basic concepts of arguments, questions and puzzles about the concept of God and divine attributes, and the 3 main arguments for God's existence.
For Wednesday we discuss Hume's objections to the design argument. The reading is long and challenging! OPS writing assignment due.
For Friday October 10, 10-10:50am we will meet at Hope Hall -- between Tech Towers -- Room 209 for a guest lecture from Dr. Larry Blumer. He will discuss the theory of evolution. BE THERE AND BE THERE ON TIME!
For next Monday and Wednesday we will discuss the versions of the ontological argument. Readings in Cahn. More details soon.
For Monday, Paley on the design / teleological argument in Cahn. OPS due.
For Wednesday, Hume on the design argument / teleological in Cahn. Note: this selection is long and a bit more challenging. Need to read ahead and re-read!
For Friday, we should have a guest speaker from the biology department who will give an overview of evolutionary theory. Here is some of what he's been asked to address:
Briefly, what's a theory? What's a scientific theory?
What data, phenomena or observations does the (or a) theory of evolution attempt to explain?
What are competing theories or hypotheses that attempt to explain this data or phenomena?
What's the (or a) evolutionary theory? How does it explain?
Is there anything that evolutionary theory has a difficult time explaining?
Should we accept evolutionary theory? Why is it better than rivals? How does one decide these things?
Any comments on confusions and misunderstandings behind the common claim, "Evolution is a theory, not a fact" would be appreciated.
First published Tue Jul 13, 2004; substantive revision Thu Sep 11, 2008
The cosmological argument is less a particular argument than an argument type. It uses a general pattern of argumentation (logos) that makes an inference from certain alleged facts about the world (cosmos) to the existence of a unique being, generally identified with or referred to as God. Among these initial facts are that the world came into being, that the world is contingent in that it could have been other than it is, or that certain beings or events in the world are causally dependent or contingent. From these facts philosophers infer either deductively or inductively that a first cause, a necessary being, an unmoved mover, or a personal being (God) exists. The cosmological argument is part of classical natural theology, whose goal has been to provide some evidence for the claim that God exists.
On the one hand, the argument arises from human curiosity as to why there is something rather than nothing. It invokes a concern for some complete, ultimate, or best explanation of what exists contingently. On the other hand, it raises intrinsically important philosophical questions about contingency and necessity, causation and explanation, part/whole relationships (mereology), infinity, sets, and the nature and origin of the universe. In what follows we will first sketch out a very brief history of the argument, note the two fundamental types of deductive cosmological arguments, and then provide a careful analysis of each, first the argument from contingency, then the argument from the impossibility of an infinite temporal regress of causes. In the end we will consider an inductive version of the cosmological argument.
[The arguments can be simplified but just using the bolded premises; other premises are often sub-arguments for some of these premises]
The First Way: Argument from Motion
Some things are in motion.
Things move when potential motion becomes actual motion.
Only an actual motion can convert a potential motion into an actual motion.
Nothing can be at once in both actuality and potentiality in the same respect (i.e., if both actual and potential, it is actual in one respect and potential in another).
Therefore nothing can move itself.
Therefore each thing in motion is moved by something else.
The sequence of motion cannot extend ad infinitum.
Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.
The Second Way: Argument from Efficient Causes
We perceive a series of efficient causes of things in the world.
Nothing exists prior to itself.
Therefore nothing is the efficient cause of itself.
If a previous efficient cause does not exist, neither does the thing that results.
Therefore if the first thing in a series does not exist, nothing in the series exists.
The series of efficient causes cannot extend ad infinitum into the past, for then there would be no things existing now.
Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.
The Third Way: Argument from Possibility and Necessity (Reductio argument)
We find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be, that come into being and go out of being i.e., contingent beings.
Assume (for the sake of argument) that every being is a contingent being.
For each contingent being, there is a time it does not exist.
Therefore it is impossible for these always to exist.[If a being exists contingently, then it does not exist necessarily]
Therefore there could have been a time when no things existed.
Therefore at that time there would have been nothing to bring the currently existing contingent beings into existence.
Therefore, nothing would be in existence now.
We have reached an absurd result from assuming that every being is a contingent being.
Therefore not every being is a contingent being.
Therefore some being exists of its own necessity, and does not receive its existence from another being, but rather causes them. This all men speak of as God.
The Fourth Way: Argument from Gradation of Being
There is a gradation to be found in things: some are better or worse than others.
Predications of degree require reference to the “uttermost” case (e.g., a thing is said to be hotter according as it more nearly resembles that which is hottest).
The maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus.
Therefore there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being, goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call God.
The Fifth Way: Argument from Design
We see that natural bodies work toward some goal, and do not do so by chance.
Most natural things lack knowledge.
But as an arrow reaches its target because it is directed by an archer, what lacks intelligence achieves goals by being directed by something intelligence.
Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call God.
> From: pr.society@hotmail.com > Subject: First Philosophy and Religion Society Meeting > Date: Fri, 26 Sep 2008 11:19:08 -0400 > > > > > Hello All, > > > > I hope all is well. This email is being sent to notify you all of the first official meeting of the Philosophy and Religion Society for the 2008-09 academic school year. The meeting will be held on Wednesday, October 1, 2008. Our start time will be 7pm and we will be located in Sale Hall (room 109). We ask that you please be prompt, so that we can conclude on time. The meeting should be quite brief. No more than one hour. (we were finished after 45 minutes last meeting). We do desire to be respectful of your time. > > > > During this meeting, we plan to go through brief introductions of new members, but also propose the mission and vision of the society for this year. Another pressing issue that we must discuss is the upcoming Vanderbilt Conference. The conference is in November so we need to get all of the information on the table as soon as possible. > > > > We will probably also begin to discuss our first social functions. I hope to see you all at the meeting on next Wednesday. And I hope that we are all looking forward to a new, exciting, and productive year. > > > > Best, > > > > Taurean Webb > > President >
So far we have mostly been doing "philosophical theology," i.e., thinking about the concept of God, thinking about what God is like if He exists, thinking about the nature of various attributes of God, thinking about their relationships, and so forth.
Our next task is to think about whether God exists or not, whether there is an existing being that fits the description of God. So, is there an all-powerful, all-good, all-knowing being or not?
Here we turn to the arguments for God's existence and against, arguments for the conclusion God exists and the conclusion God does not exist. Monday we will look at Aquinas's arguments, his famous "5 Ways."
Friday, however, I want us to develop an informal list of the various arguments and reasons that you think motivate most people's belief or disbelieve in God's existence (as well as what motivates agnosticism, i.e., suspending judgment). So here are the questions:
For people who believe that God exists, what reasons do, or would, they give to support their belief? A different question (how so?) is, What might cause people to believe in God?
For people who believe that God does not exist, what reasons do, or would, they give to support their belief? A different question (how so?) is, What might cause people to believe there is not God?
For people who have considered the question but neither believe nor disbelieve that God exists, what reasons do, or would, they give to support their belief? A different question (how so?) is, What might cause people to be agnostics?
We want to make lists of as many reasons as we can possibly think of. Try to be exhaustive. Anything you have heard or can imagine hearing is worth writing down.
The next question is whether which, if any, of these reasons are good reasons or not.
I asked JC to moderate and record.
For Monday:
Aquinas's 5 Ways; OPS due
For Wed:
Taylor and Hick on the Cosmological Argument; OPS due
1 TI: WORSHIP AND MORAL AUTONOMY. AU: LOMBARDI,-JOSEPH-L SO: Religious-Studies. JE 88; 24: 101-119 IS: 0034-4125 AB: JAMES RACHELS PRESENTED AN ARGUMENT FOR THE NECESSARY NONEXISTENCE OF GOD WHICH WAS CRITICIZED BY PHILIP QUINN AND ROBERT OAKES. REASONS ARE OFFERED FOR THINKING THAT QUINN'S RECONSTRUCTION MISREPRESENTS RACHELS'S VIEWS. IT IS ALSO ARGUED THAT THE ATTEMPTS OF QUINN AND OAKES TO EXCLUDE POSSIBLE INCOMPATIBILITY BETWEEN DIVINE OBEDIENCE AND MORAL AUTONOMY ARE NOT PERSUASIVE. FINALLY, A DIFFERENT REASON IS GIVEN FOR BELIEVING THAT RACHELS'S ARGUMENT IS UNSOUND. A BRIEF POSTSCRIPT DISCUSSES QUINN'S RECENT SUGGESTION THAT THE OBLIGATION ASSOCIATED WITH WORSHIP IS NOT A MORAL OBLIGATION BUT A "RELIGIOUS" ONE. DE: AUTONOMY-; GOD-; RELIGION-; WORSHIP- PS: QUINN,-P; RACHELS,-J LA: ENGLISH DT: Journal-Article AN: 1163069 in The Philosopher's Index 1940-2007/06.
2 TI: KANTIAN AUTONOMY AND DIVINE COMMANDS. AU: MURPHY,-JEFFRIE-G SO: Faith-and-Philosophy. JL 87; 4: 276-281 IS: 0739-7046 AB: JAMES RACHELS HAS ARGUED THAT A MORALLY AUTONOMOUS PERSON (IN KANT'S SENSE) COULD NOT CONSISTENTLY ACCEPT THE AUTHORITY OF DIVINE COMMANDS. AGAINST RACHELS, THIS ESSAY ARGUES (A) THAT THE KANTIAN CONCEPT OF MORAL AUTONOMY IS TO BE ANALYZED IN TERMS OF AN AGENT'S RESPONSIVENESS TO THE BEST AVAILABLE MORAL REASONS AND (B) THAT IT IS SIMPLY QUESTION-BEGGING AGAINST DIVINE COMMAND THEORY TO ASSUME THAT SUCH COMMANDS COULD NOT COUNT AS THE BEST MORAL REASONS AVAILABLE TO AN AGENT. DE: AUTONOMY-; COMMAND-; DIVINE-; ETHICS-; GOD- PS: KANT,-IMMANUEL LA: ENGLISH DT: Journal-Article AN: 1151390 in The Philosopher's Index 1940-2007/06.
3 TI: RELIGIOUS OBEDIENCE AND MORAL AUTONOMY. AU: QUINN,-PHILIP-L SO: Religious-Studies. S 75; 11: 265-281 IS: 0034-4125 AB: THE PURPOSE OF THIS PAPER IS TO EXPLORE THE RELATIONS BETWEEN MORAL AUTONOMY AND RELIGIOUS OBEDIENCE. AN ARGUMENT CONSTRUCTED BY JAMES RACHELS, WHICH PURPORTS TO SHOW THAT THEY ARE INCOMPATIBLE, IS PROVED TO BE UNSOUND. IT IS ARGUED THAT THERE ARE EPISTEMIC SITUATIONS IN WHICH IT WOULD BE REASONABLE TO BELIEVE THAT ONE HAD RECEIVED A DIVINE COMMAND, AND THE KANTIAN RESPONSE TO THE STORY OF ABRAHAM AND ISAAC IS CRITICIZED. TECHNICAL NOTIONS OF AUTONOMY AND OBEDIENCE, ACCORDING TO WHICH THEY ARE INCOMPATIBLE PROVIDED MORALITY DOES NOT DEPEND ON THE DIVINE WILL, ARE DEFINED, BUT IT IS SUGGESTED THAT AUTONOMY, SO DEFINED, IS NOT A SENSIBLE MORAL IDEAL. DE: AUTONOMY-; GOD-; RELIGION-; WORSHIP- PS: RACHELS,-J LA: ENGLISH DT: Journal-Article AN: 1049540 in The Philosopher's Index 1940-2007/06.
4 TI: REPLY TO PROFESSOR RACHELS. AU: OAKES,-ROBERT-A SO: Religious-Studies. JE 72; 8: 165-167 IS: 0034-4125 AB: THIS PAPER CONSTITUTES A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR JAMES RACHELS' "GOD AND HUMAN ATTITUDES" WHICH APPEARED IN THE DECEMBER 1971 ISSUE OF "RELIGIOUS STUDIES", PP. 325-337. I ATTEMPT TO SHOW THAT RACHELS' PUTATIVE ONTOLOGICAL DISPROOF OF GOD FAILS INSOFAR AS THERE IS NO LOGICAL INCOMPATIBILITY BETWEEN THE AXIOLOGICAL PERFECTION OF GOD AND HUMAN MORAL AGENCY. DE: EXISTENCE-; GOD-; RELIGION- PS: RACHELS,-J LA: ENGLISH DT: Journal-Article AN: 1037781 in The Philosopher's Index 1940-2007/06.
5 TI: GOD AND HUMAN ATTITUDES. AU: RACHELS,-JAMES SO: Religious-Studies.; 7: 325-338 IS: 0034-4125 DE: AUTONOMY-; GOD-; RELIGION-; WORSHIP- LA: ENGLISH DT: Journal-Article AN: 1077625 in The Philosopher's Index 1940-2007/06.
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