Philosophy and Religion Society Meeting

> From: pr.society@hotmail.com
> Subject: First Philosophy and Religion Society Meeting
> Date: Fri, 26 Sep 2008 11:19:08 -0400
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> Hello All,
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> I hope all is well. This email is being sent to notify you all of the first official meeting of the Philosophy and Religion Society for the 2008-09 academic school year. The meeting will be held on Wednesday, October 1, 2008. Our start time will be 7pm and we will be located in Sale Hall (room 109). We ask that you please be prompt, so that we can conclude on time. The meeting should be quite brief. No more than one hour. (we were finished after 45 minutes last meeting). We do desire to be respectful of your time.
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> During this meeting, we plan to go through brief introductions of new members, but also propose the mission and vision of the society for this year. Another pressing issue that we must discuss is the upcoming Vanderbilt Conference. The conference is in November so we need to get all of the information on the table as soon as possible.
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> We will probably also begin to discuss our first social functions. I hope to see you all at the meeting on next Wednesday. And I hope that we are all looking forward to a new, exciting, and productive year.
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> Best,
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> Taurean Webb
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> President
>

For Friday, Monday, and Wed.

For Friday:

So far we have mostly been doing "philosophical theology," i.e., thinking about the concept of God, thinking about what God is like if He exists, thinking about the nature of various attributes of God, thinking about their relationships, and so forth.

Our next task is to think about whether God exists or not, whether there is an existing being that fits the description of God. So, is there an all-powerful, all-good, all-knowing being or not?

Here we turn to the arguments for God's existence and against, arguments for the conclusion God exists and the conclusion God does not exist. Monday we will look at Aquinas's arguments, his famous "5 Ways."

Friday, however, I want us to develop an informal list of the various arguments and reasons that you think motivate most people's belief or disbelieve in God's existence (as well as what motivates agnosticism, i.e., suspending judgment). So here are the questions:

• For people who believe that God exists, what reasons do, or would, they give to support their belief? A different question (how so?) is, What might cause people to believe in God?
• For people who believe that God does not exist, what reasons do, or would, they give to support their belief? A different question (how so?) is, What might cause people to believe there is not God?
• For people who have considered the question but neither believe nor disbelieve that God exists, what reasons do, or would, they give to support their belief? A different question (how so?) is, What might cause people to be agnostics?
  

We want to make lists of as many reasons as we can possibly think of. Try to be exhaustive. Anything you have heard or can imagine hearing is worth writing down.

The next question is whether which, if any, of these reasons are good reasons or not.

I asked JC to moderate and record.

For Monday:

Aquinas's 5 Ways; OPS due

For Wed:

Taylor and Hick on the Cosmological Argument; OPS due

Commentary on Rachels

1 TI: WORSHIP AND MORAL AUTONOMY.
AU: LOMBARDI,-JOSEPH-L
SO: Religious-Studies. JE 88; 24: 101-119
IS: 0034-4125
AB: JAMES RACHELS PRESENTED AN ARGUMENT FOR THE NECESSARY NONEXISTENCE OF GOD WHICH WAS CRITICIZED BY PHILIP QUINN AND ROBERT OAKES. REASONS ARE OFFERED FOR THINKING THAT QUINN'S RECONSTRUCTION MISREPRESENTS RACHELS'S VIEWS. IT IS ALSO ARGUED THAT THE ATTEMPTS OF QUINN AND OAKES TO EXCLUDE POSSIBLE INCOMPATIBILITY BETWEEN DIVINE OBEDIENCE AND MORAL AUTONOMY ARE NOT PERSUASIVE. FINALLY, A DIFFERENT REASON IS GIVEN FOR BELIEVING THAT RACHELS'S ARGUMENT IS UNSOUND. A BRIEF POSTSCRIPT DISCUSSES QUINN'S RECENT SUGGESTION THAT THE OBLIGATION ASSOCIATED WITH WORSHIP IS NOT A MORAL OBLIGATION BUT A "RELIGIOUS" ONE.
DE: AUTONOMY-; GOD-; RELIGION-; WORSHIP-
PS: QUINN,-P; RACHELS,-J
LA: ENGLISH
DT: Journal-Article
AN: 1163069
in The Philosopher's Index 1940-2007/06.

2 TI: KANTIAN AUTONOMY AND DIVINE COMMANDS.
AU: MURPHY,-JEFFRIE-G
SO: Faith-and-Philosophy. JL 87; 4: 276-281
IS: 0739-7046
AB: JAMES RACHELS HAS ARGUED THAT A MORALLY AUTONOMOUS PERSON (IN KANT'S SENSE) COULD NOT CONSISTENTLY ACCEPT THE AUTHORITY OF DIVINE COMMANDS. AGAINST RACHELS, THIS ESSAY ARGUES (A) THAT THE KANTIAN CONCEPT OF MORAL AUTONOMY IS TO BE ANALYZED IN TERMS OF AN AGENT'S RESPONSIVENESS TO THE BEST AVAILABLE MORAL REASONS AND (B) THAT IT IS SIMPLY QUESTION-BEGGING AGAINST DIVINE COMMAND THEORY TO ASSUME THAT SUCH COMMANDS COULD NOT COUNT AS THE BEST MORAL REASONS AVAILABLE TO AN AGENT.
DE: AUTONOMY-; COMMAND-; DIVINE-; ETHICS-; GOD-
PS: KANT,-IMMANUEL
LA: ENGLISH
DT: Journal-Article
AN: 1151390
in The Philosopher's Index 1940-2007/06.

3 TI: RELIGIOUS OBEDIENCE AND MORAL AUTONOMY.
AU: QUINN,-PHILIP-L
SO: Religious-Studies. S 75; 11: 265-281
IS: 0034-4125
AB: THE PURPOSE OF THIS PAPER IS TO EXPLORE THE RELATIONS BETWEEN MORAL AUTONOMY AND RELIGIOUS OBEDIENCE. AN ARGUMENT CONSTRUCTED BY JAMES RACHELS, WHICH PURPORTS TO SHOW THAT THEY ARE INCOMPATIBLE, IS PROVED TO BE UNSOUND. IT IS ARGUED THAT THERE ARE EPISTEMIC SITUATIONS IN WHICH IT WOULD BE REASONABLE TO BELIEVE THAT ONE HAD RECEIVED A DIVINE COMMAND, AND THE KANTIAN RESPONSE TO THE STORY OF ABRAHAM AND ISAAC IS CRITICIZED. TECHNICAL NOTIONS OF AUTONOMY AND OBEDIENCE, ACCORDING TO WHICH THEY ARE INCOMPATIBLE PROVIDED MORALITY DOES NOT DEPEND ON THE DIVINE WILL, ARE DEFINED, BUT IT IS SUGGESTED THAT AUTONOMY, SO DEFINED, IS NOT A SENSIBLE MORAL IDEAL.
DE: AUTONOMY-; GOD-; RELIGION-; WORSHIP-
PS: RACHELS,-J
LA: ENGLISH
DT: Journal-Article
AN: 1049540
in The Philosopher's Index 1940-2007/06.

4 TI: REPLY TO PROFESSOR RACHELS.
AU: OAKES,-ROBERT-A
SO: Religious-Studies. JE 72; 8: 165-167
IS: 0034-4125
AB: THIS PAPER CONSTITUTES A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR JAMES RACHELS' "GOD AND HUMAN ATTITUDES" WHICH APPEARED IN THE DECEMBER 1971 ISSUE OF "RELIGIOUS STUDIES", PP. 325-337. I ATTEMPT TO SHOW THAT RACHELS' PUTATIVE ONTOLOGICAL DISPROOF OF GOD FAILS INSOFAR AS THERE IS NO LOGICAL INCOMPATIBILITY BETWEEN THE AXIOLOGICAL PERFECTION OF GOD AND HUMAN MORAL AGENCY.
DE: EXISTENCE-; GOD-; RELIGION-
PS: RACHELS,-J
LA: ENGLISH
DT: Journal-Article
AN: 1037781
in The Philosopher's Index 1940-2007/06.

5 TI: GOD AND HUMAN ATTITUDES.
AU: RACHELS,-JAMES
SO: Religious-Studies.; 7: 325-338
IS: 0034-4125
DE: AUTONOMY-; GOD-; RELIGION-; WORSHIP-
LA: ENGLISH
DT: Journal-Article
AN: 1077625
in The Philosopher's Index 1940-2007/06.

For Wednesday

8. God and the Concept of Worship , James Rachels , p. 38 in Cahn’s Exploring Philosophy of Religion

Some additional articles on God & Forgiveness, with some abstracts

TI:	The Nature of God's Love and Forgiveness
		AU:	Drabkin,-Douglas
		SO:	Religious-Studies. Je 93; 29(2): 231-238
		IS:	0034-4125
		AB:	1) I suggest that God, a being good in the best possible combination of ways, loves us by promoting our true good -- the moral life -- while being disposed to feel joy when we are good, and sorrow when we are evil. I defend this view against Creel, who argues that God cannot suffer, since suffering is neither intrinsically good nor good in virtue of its consequences. 2) I argue, against Minas, that God will forgive us, by feeling joy on our account and ceasing to suffer, provided we repent and commit to becoming good. 3) I argue that emotional change is compatible with omniscience.
		DE:	CHRISTIANITY-; FORGIVENESS-; GOD-; LOVE-; RELIGION-
		LA:	English

TI:	God and Forgiveness
		AU:	Londey,-David
		SO:	Sophia-. 1992; 31(1-2): 101-109
		IS:	0038-1527
		DE:	EVIL-; FORGIVENESS-; GOD-; RELIGION-
		PS:	BRIEN,-A
		LA:	English
		DT:	Journal-Article
		AN:	1236736

	7	TI:	CAN GOD FORGIVE US OUR TRESPASSES?
		AU:	BRIEN,-ANDREW
		SO:	Sophia-. JL 89; 28: 35-42
		IS:	0038-1527
		AB:	IN HIS PAPER "CAN GOD FORGIVE US OUR TRESPASSES?" ("SOPHIA", 25, JULY 1986, 4-10), DAVID LONDEY ARGUES THAT IT IS LOGICALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR AN IDEAL MORAL AGENT (IMA) TO FORGIVE AND ACT RIGHTLY. IN MY PAPER I ARGUE THAT HIS ARGUMENT FAILS FOR AT LEAST TWO REASONS. FIRST, IT IS INVALID DUE TO EQUIVOCATION BETWEEN TYPES OF 'OUGHT' IN HIS ARGUMENT. SECOND, EVEN IF THE ARGUMENT WERE VALID, IT CANNOT GUARANTEE THE TRUTH OF THE CONCLUSION BECAUSE IT RESTS UPON LONDEY'S ACCOUNT OF FORGIVENESS, WHICH IS, ITSELF, FALSE. THE PAPER HAS THREE SECTIONS. IN THE FIRST SECTION I SET OUT THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN 'OUGHTS'. IN THE SECOND SECTION I CONSIDER THE VALIDITY OF THE ARGUMENT IN THE LIGHT OF THIS. IN THE THIRD SECTION I CONSIDER LONDEY'S ACCOUNT OF FORGIVENESS.
		DE:	AGENCY-; FORGIVENESS-; GOD-; MORALITY-; RELIGION-

9	TI:	CAN GOD FORGIVE?
		AU:	PATON,-MARGARET
		SO:	Modern-Theology. AP 88; 4: 225-233
		IS:	0266-7177
		DE:	DIVINE-; FORGIVENESS-; GOD-; RELIGION-
		LA:	ENGLISH
		DT:	Journal-Article
		AN:	1156918

TI:	CAN GOD FORGIVE US OUR TRESPASSES?
		AU:	LONDEY,-DAVID
		SO:	Sophia-. JL 86; 25: 4-10
		IS:	0038-1527
		AB:	A SHORT ANALYSIS IS GIVEN OF THE ACT OF FORGIVING, WHICH IS DISTINGUISHED FROM SHOWING MERCY. IT IS SHOWN THAT FORGIVING INVOLVES TOTAL REMISSION OF DESERVED PENALTIES, INCLUDING MORAL CENSURE. AN ARGUMENT IN SENECA ("DE CLEMENTIA", II,7) REJECTS FORGIVING AS WRONG BECAUSE THE FORGIVER OMITS WHAT HE OUGHT TO DO. ALTHOUGH THIS ARGUMENT DOES NOT HOLD FOR ORDINARY MORAL AGENTS, IT DOES HOLD FOR PERFECT MORAL AGENTS--WHENCE, A MORALLY PERFECT GOD CANNOT FORGIVE WRONGDOERS.
		DE:	FORGIVENESS-; GOD-; MERCY-; RELIGION-

I:	FORGIVENESS.
		AU:	HUGHES,-MARTIN
		SO:	Analysis-. MR 75; 35: 113-117
		IS:	0003-2638
		DE:	FORGIVENESS-; GOD-; RELIGION-
		PS:	GINGELL,-J
		LA:	ENGLISH
		DT:	Journal-Article
		AN:	1046965

	13	TI:	GOD AND FORGIVENESS.
		AU:	MINAS,-ANNE-C
		SO:	Philosophical-Quarterly. AP 75; 25: 138-150
		IS:	0031-8094
		AB:	I TRY TO SHOW HOW IT IS LOGICALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR GOD TO FORGIVE ANYONE, BECAUSE OF INCOMPATIBILITY BETWEEN THE CONCEPTS OF 'DIVINITY' AND 'FORGIVENESS'. I MAKE SOME FAIRLY STANDARD ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT 'DIVINITY' AND THEN FIND EIGHT OR NINE TYPES OF 'FORGIVENESS'. WITH EACH TYPE I TRY TO SHOW THAT IT'S NOT AN ACTION A DIVINE BEING CAN PERFORM.
		DE:	FORGIVENESS-; GOD-; PUNISHMENT-; RELIGION-; RESENTMENT-
		PS:	BUTLER

TI:	FORGIVENESS AND POWER.
		AU:	GINGELL,-JOHN
		SO:	Analysis-. JE 74; 34: 180-183
		IS:	0003-2638
		DE:	FORGIVENESS-; GOD-; POWER-; RELIGION-
		LA:	ENGLISH
		DT:	Journal-Article
		AN:	1043812

God and Free Will

Foreknowledge and Free Will

Suppose it were known, by someone else, what you are going to choose to do tomorrow. Wouldn't that entail that tomorrow you must do what it was known in advance that you would do? In spite of your deliberating and planning, in the end, all is futile: you must choose exactly as it was earlier known that you would. The supposed exercise of your free will is ultimately an illusion. Historically, the tension between foreknowledge and the exercise of free will was addressed in a religious context. According to orthodox views in the West, God was claimed to be omniscient (and hence in possession of perfect foreknowledge) and yet God was supposed to have given humankind free will. Attempts to solve the apparent contradiction often involved attributing to God special properties, for example, being "outside" of time. However, the trouble with such solutions is that they are generally unsatisfactory on their own terms. Even more serious is the fact that they leave untouched the problem posed not by God's foreknowledge but that of any human being. Do human beings have foreknowledge? Certainly, of at least some events and behaviors. Thus we have a secular counterpart of the original problem. A human being's foreknowledge, exactly as would God's, of another's choices would seem to preclude the exercise of human free will. Various ways of trying to solve the problem – for example, by putting constraints on the truth-conditions for statements, or by "tightening" the conditions necessary for knowledge – are examined and shown not to work. Ultimately the alleged incompatibility of foreknowledge and free will is shown to rest on a subtle logical error. When the error, a modal fallacy, is recognized, and remedied, the problem evaporates. Table of Contents (Clicking on the links below will take you to that part of this article) 1. Introduction: The Problem of Foreknowledge and Free Will 2. Three Kinds of Determinism 3. The Relationship Between Epistemic and Logical Determinism 4. Attacking the Premises of Deterministic Arguments 4a. Can a Future Contingent be true prior to the event it refers to? 4b. Can a Future Contingent be known prior to the event it refers to? 5. Possibility, Necessity, and Contingency 6. The Modal Fallacy 6a. The Modal Fallacy in Logical Determinism 6b. The Modal Fallacy in Epistemic Determinism 7. Residual concerns – Changing the past; Changing the future 8. Concluding Remarks Further Reading Notes

For Monday:

7. God and Forgiveness, Anne Minas, p. 25 in Cahn’s Exploring Philosophy of Religion
8. God and the Concept of Worship , James Rachels , p. 38 in Cahn’s Exploring Philosophy of Religion

OPS Writing assignments due on both.

Philosophy Club

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From: pr.society@hotmail.com


Greetings:

I thank all of you who have responded to requests concerning participation in Morehouse College’s Philosophy and Religion Society for the 2008-09 academic school year. Your interest is very much appreciated.

Although it is on somewhat short notice, our first meeting/ interest meeting will be held on tomorrow, Wednesday, September 17, 2008 at 5pm in Sale Hall. I apologize for the short notice, but we were running into some scheduling conflicts.

I would very much like for all of you to attend. We will be introducing the organization, its purpose, officers and general plans for the upcoming academic school year. We plan to hold meetings at least twice a month, but tomorrow’s meeting is important because it will lay foundational work concerning who concretely desires to participate in the organization and functions. We do not plan to hold you long.

Additionally, please invite all of your friends/ colleagues that are either philosophy/ religion majors or minors AND all those who have a general interest in philosophical or religious studies discourse (in its academic function). We will open the society up to ALL MAJORS.

As for right now, that is all. I wish you all well for the rest of the day and I hope to see you Wednesday afternoon at 5.


Best,

Taurean J Webb
President, Philosophy and Religion Society

Today we discussed the concepts of a logical implication, logical consequence and/or a logical entailment.

For Wednesday, we will discuss various responses to the problem of divine foreknowledge and human free will. OPS writing assignments due on all of them, if you haven't turned them in yet:

3. God's Foreknowledge and Free Will , Augustine , p. 11 in Cahn’s Exploring Philosophy of Religion

4. God's Omniscience and Contingent Events , Levi Gersonides , p. 13 in Cahn’s Exploring Philosophy of Religion

5. Does God Know the Future? , Steven M. Cahn , p. 16 in Cahn’s Exploring Philosophy of Religion

For Friday; OPS writing assignments due then:

6. Does God Change? , William Hacker , p. 20 in Cahn’s Exploring Philosophy of Religion

8. God and the Concept of Worship , James Rachels , p. 38 in Cahn’s Exploring Philosophy of Religion

FYI here's an overview of the topic discussed yesterday:
http://www.iep.utm.edu/d/divine-c.htm
See especially
3. A Persistent Problem for Divine Command Theory: The Euthyphro Dilemma

relationship between God and ethics. In this dialogue, written by Plato (1981), who was a student of Socrates, Euthyphro and Socrates encounter each other in the king’s court. Charges have been brought against Socrates by Miletus, who claims that Socrates is guilty of corrupting the youth of Athens by leading them away from belief in the proper gods. In the course of their conversation, Socrates is surprised to discover that Euthyphro is prosecuting his own father for the murder of a servant. Euthyphro’s family is upset with him because of this, and they believe that what he is doing—prosecuting his own father—is impious. Euthyphro maintains that his family fails to understand the divine attitude to his action. This then sets the stage for a discussion of the nature of piety between Socrates and Euthyphro. In this discussion, Socrates asks Euthyphro the now philosophically famous question that he and any divine command theorist must consider: “Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?” (p. 14).

For our purposes, it will be useful to rephrase Socrates’ question. Socrates can be understood as asking “Does God command this particular action because it is morally right, or is it morally right because God commands it?” It is in answering this question that the divine command theorist encounters a difficulty. A defender of Divine Command Theory might respond that an action is morally right because God commands it. However, the implication of this response is that if God commanded that we inflict suffering on others for fun, then doing so would be morally right. We would be obligated to do so, because God commanded it. This is because, on Divine Command Theory, the reason that inflicting such suffering is wrong is that God commands us not to do it. However, if God commanded us to inflict such suffering, doing so would become the morally right thing to do. The problem for this response to Socrates’ question, then, is that God’s commands and therefore the foundations of morality become arbitrary, which then allows for morally reprehensible actions to become morally obligatory.

Most advocates of Divine Command Theory do not want to be stuck with the implication that cruelty could possibly be morally right, nor do they want to accept the implication that the foundations of morality are arbitrary. So, a divine command theorist might avoid this problem of arbitrariness by opting for a different answer to Socrates’ question, and say that for any particular action that God commands, He commands it because it is morally right. By taking this route, the divine command theorist avoids having to accept that inflicting suffering on others for fun could be a morally right action. More generally, she avoids the arbitrariness that plagues any Divine Command Theory which includes the claim that an action is right solely because God commands it. However, two new problems now arise. If God commands a particular action because it is morally right, then ethics no longer depends on God in the way that Divine Command Theorists maintain. God is no longer the author of ethics, but rather a mere recognizer of right and wrong. As such, God no longer serves as the foundation of ethics. Moreover, it now seems that God has become subject to an external moral law, and is no longer sovereign. John Arthur (2005) puts the point this way: “If God approves kindness because it is a virtue and hates the Nazis because they were evil, then it seems that God discovers morality rather than inventing it” (20, emphasis added). God is no longer sovereign over the entire universe, but rather is subject to a moral law external to himself. The notion that God is subject to an external moral law is also a problem for theists who hold that in the great chain of being, God is at the top. Here, there is a moral law external to and higher than God, and this is a consequence that many divine command theorists would want to reject. Hence, the advocate of a Divine Command Theory of ethics faces a dilemma: morality either rests on arbitrary foundations, or God is not the source of ethics and is subject to an external moral law, both of which allegedly compromise his supreme moral and metaphysical status.

For Monday and Wednesday

For Monday and Wednesday, OPS writing assignments due Monday on all of them:

3. God's Foreknowledge and Free Will , Augustine , p. 11 in Cahn’s Exploring Philosophy of Religion

4. God's Omniscience and Contingent Events , Levi Gersonides , p. 13 in Cahn’s Exploring Philosophy of Religion

5. Does God Know the Future? , Steven M. Cahn , p. 16 in Cahn’s Exploring Philosophy of Religion

For Friday; OPS writing assignments due then:

6. Does God Change? , William Hacker , p. 20 in Cahn’s Exploring Philosophy of Religion

8. God and the Concept of Worship , James Rachels , p. 38 in Cahn’s Exploring Philosophy of Religion

Online Readings

The first set of readings from Cahn are available here for people who can't / don't get the book yet:

http://aphilosopher.googlepages.com/cahn-first-readings.pdf

For Wed.:

1. God and Goodness , James Rachels, p. 5, in Cahn’s Exploring Philosophy of Religion

2. God's Omnipotence , George Mavrodes , p. 8 in Cahn’s Exploring Philosophy of Religion

Here are some notes that discuss in greater detail what we discussed today regarding Clifford and the intellectual/epistemic and moral questions of what you ought to believe:

4. The Ethics of Belief (September 27- Oct. 6, 2006)

5. Evidentialism (October 6-13, 2006)

Update

I thought I would send out an email noting what has been assigned for reading thus far.
While I said that we would discuss Clifford, Rachels and Mavrodes Monday, I think we will likely only talk about Clifford and Rachels, leaving Mavrodes for Wed. Friday we will begin these readings:

3. God's Foreknowledge and Free Will , Augustine , p. 11 in Cahn’s Exploring Philosophy of Religion

4. God's Omniscience and Contingent Events , Levi Gersonides , p. 13 in Cahn’s Exploring Philosophy of Religion

5. Does God Know the Future? , Steven M. Cahn , p. 16 in Cahn’s Exploring Philosophy of Religion

Here is what's been assigned:

· ONLINE ARTICLE or HANDOUT: Allen Stairs, “A Right To Be Wrong?” http://brindedcow.umd.edu/philosophy/opinions.html

• 37. The Ethics of Belief , W. K. Clifford , p. 195 in Cahn’s Exploring Philosophy of Religion

• Preface , viii in Cahn’s Exploring Philosophy of Religion
• Introduction, 1 in Cahn’s Exploring Philosophy of Religion
• ONLINE ARTICLE or HANDOUT: William Lane Craig, "God Is Not Dead Yet: How current philosophers argue for his existence," Christianity Today, July 2008. At http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2008/july/13.22.html
• Introduction. p. 327 in Cahn’s appendix book God, Reason, and Religion in his Exploring Philosophy of Religion: An Introductory Anthology

· Proving God's Existence? P. 328 in Cahn’s appendix book God, Reason, and Religion in his Exploring Philosophy of Religion: An Introductory Anthology

· Vaughn:

o Ch. 1, How to Read Philosophy;

o Ch. 2, How to Read an Argument;

o Ch. 5, Avoiding Fallacious Reasoning

o Basic Logic handout: http://aphilosopher.googlepages.com/arguments.pdf

Part I: The Concept of God: If God exists, then what is God like?

1. God and Goodness , James Rachels, p. 5, in Cahn’s Exploring Philosophy of Religion

2. God's Omnipotence , George Mavrodes , p. 8 in Cahn’s Exploring Philosophy of Religion

Friday and Monday

For Friday:

• 37. The Ethics of Belief , W. K. Clifford , p. 195 in Cahn’s Exploring Philosophy of Religion

· Vaughn:

o Ch. 1, How to Read Philosophy;

o Ch. 2, How to Read an Argument;

o Ch. 5, Avoiding Fallacious Reasoning

o Basic Logic handout: http://aphilosopher.googlepages.com/arguments.pdf

For Monday, we will start thinking about some questions about the traditional concept of God. Here is the writing assignment about the readings:

1. “OPS” (Outline, Paraphrase, &/or Summarize the Argument) writing assignments: 25% of grade

The absolute most important thing you can do to succeed in this class is to do the reading and do the reading well. A (tentative) schedule of readings is below and will be announced in class. To encourage you do the readings well and so be prepared for class discussion, you will be required to write 1-3 page outlines, paraphrases &/or summaries of the arguments of nearly all of the readings or selections of them. Vaughn’s Writing Philosophy, Ch. 1 provides instruction on how to do this. What most important for these assignments is that you (a) identify the author’s main conclusions, and (b) explain the reasons he or she gives in favor of these conclusions and (c) explain whether these reasons are a valid and sound argument for that conclusion or not. Merely copying a writing’s Introduction will result in a zero for the assignment, as will any other kind of plagiarism.

Part I: The Concept of God: If God exists, then what is God like?

1. God and Goodness , James Rachels, p. 5, in Cahn’s Exploring Philosophy of Religion

2. God's Omnipotence , George Mavrodes , p. 8 in Cahn’s Exploring Philosophy of Religion