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Cosmological Argument

First published Tue Jul 13, 2004; substantive revision Thu Sep 11, 2008

The cosmological argument is less a particular argument than an argument type. It uses a general pattern of argumentation (logos) that makes an inference from certain alleged facts about the world (cosmos) to the existence of a unique being, generally identified with or referred to as God. Among these initial facts are that the world came into being, that the world is contingent in that it could have been other than it is, or that certain beings or events in the world are causally dependent or contingent. From these facts philosophers infer either deductively or inductively that a first cause, a necessary being, an unmoved mover, or a personal being (God) exists. The cosmological argument is part of classical natural theology, whose goal has been to provide some evidence for the claim that God exists.

On the one hand, the argument arises from human curiosity as to why there is something rather than nothing. It invokes a concern for some complete, ultimate, or best explanation of what exists contingently. On the other hand, it raises intrinsically important philosophical questions about contingency and necessity, causation and explanation, part/whole relationships (mereology), infinity, sets, and the nature and origin of the universe. In what follows we will first sketch out a very brief history of the argument, note the two fundamental types of deductive cosmological arguments, and then provide a careful analysis of each, first the argument from contingency, then the argument from the impossibility of an infinite temporal regress of causes. In the end we will consider an inductive version of the cosmological argument.

• 1. Historical Overview
• 2. Typology of Cosmological Arguments
• 3. Argument for a First Sustaining Cause
  • 3.1 The Deductive Argument from Contingency
  • 3.2 Objection 1: The Universe Just Is
  • 3.3 Objection 2: Explaining the Individual Constituents is Sufficient
  • 3.4 Objection 3: The Causal Principle is Suspect
  • 3.5 Objection 4: The Conclusion is Contradictory
• 4. The Kalām Cosmological Argument
  • 4.1 The Causal Principle and Quantum Physics
  • 4.2 Impossibility of an Actual Infinite?
  • 4.3 The Big Bang Theory of Cosmic Origins
  • 4.4 The Big Bang Is Not An Event
  • 4.5 A Non-finite Universe
  • 4.6 Personal Explanation
• 5. An Inductive Cosmological Argument
• Bibliography
• Other Internet Resources
• Related Entries

Aquinas's 5 Ways

St. Thomas Aquinas: The Existence of God can be proved in five ways.

Argument Analysis of the Five Ways © 2004 Theodore Gracyk

[The arguments can be simplified but just using the bolded premises; other premises are often sub-arguments for some of these premises] The First Way: Argument from Motion Some things are in motion. Things move when potential motion becomes actual motion. Only an actual motion can convert a potential motion into an actual motion. Nothing can be at once in both actuality and potentiality in the same respect (i.e., if both actual and potential, it is actual in one respect and potential in another). Therefore nothing can move itself. Therefore each thing in motion is moved by something else. The sequence of motion cannot extend ad infinitum. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God. The Second Way: Argument from Efficient Causes We perceive a series of efficient causes of things in the world. Nothing exists prior to itself. Therefore nothing is the efficient cause of itself. If a previous efficient cause does not exist, neither does the thing that results. Therefore if the first thing in a series does not exist, nothing in the series exists. The series of efficient causes cannot extend ad infinitum into the past, for then there would be no things existing now. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God. The Third Way: Argument from Possibility and Necessity (Reductio argument) We find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be, that come into being and go out of being i.e., contingent beings. Assume (for the sake of argument) that every being is a contingent being. For each contingent being, there is a time it does not exist. Therefore it is impossible for these always to exist.[If a being exists contingently, then it does not exist necessarily] Therefore there could have been a time when no things existed. Therefore at that time there would have been nothing to bring the currently existing contingent beings into existence. Therefore, nothing would be in existence now. We have reached an absurd result from assuming that every being is a contingent being. Therefore not every being is a contingent being. Therefore some being exists of its own necessity, and does not receive its existence from another being, but rather causes them. This all men speak of as God. The Fourth Way: Argument from Gradation of Being There is a gradation to be found in things: some are better or worse than others. Predications of degree require reference to the “uttermost” case (e.g., a thing is said to be hotter according as it more nearly resembles that which is hottest). The maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus. Therefore there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being, goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call God. The Fifth Way: Argument from Design We see that natural bodies work toward some goal, and do not do so by chance. Most natural things lack knowledge. But as an arrow reaches its target because it is directed by an archer, what lacks intelligence achieves goals by being directed by something intelligence. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call God.

Summary of objections:

Philosophy and Religion Society Meeting

> From: pr.society@hotmail.com
> Subject: First Philosophy and Religion Society Meeting
> Date: Fri, 26 Sep 2008 11:19:08 -0400
>
>
>
>
> Hello All,
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> I hope all is well. This email is being sent to notify you all of the first official meeting of the Philosophy and Religion Society for the 2008-09 academic school year. The meeting will be held on Wednesday, October 1, 2008. Our start time will be 7pm and we will be located in Sale Hall (room 109). We ask that you please be prompt, so that we can conclude on time. The meeting should be quite brief. No more than one hour. (we were finished after 45 minutes last meeting). We do desire to be respectful of your time.
>
>
>
> During this meeting, we plan to go through brief introductions of new members, but also propose the mission and vision of the society for this year. Another pressing issue that we must discuss is the upcoming Vanderbilt Conference. The conference is in November so we need to get all of the information on the table as soon as possible.
>
>
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> We will probably also begin to discuss our first social functions. I hope to see you all at the meeting on next Wednesday. And I hope that we are all looking forward to a new, exciting, and productive year.
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> Best,
>
>
>
> Taurean Webb
>
> President
>

For Friday, Monday, and Wed.

For Friday:

So far we have mostly been doing "philosophical theology," i.e., thinking about the concept of God, thinking about what God is like if He exists, thinking about the nature of various attributes of God, thinking about their relationships, and so forth.

Our next task is to think about whether God exists or not, whether there is an existing being that fits the description of God. So, is there an all-powerful, all-good, all-knowing being or not?

Here we turn to the arguments for God's existence and against, arguments for the conclusion God exists and the conclusion God does not exist. Monday we will look at Aquinas's arguments, his famous "5 Ways."

Friday, however, I want us to develop an informal list of the various arguments and reasons that you think motivate most people's belief or disbelieve in God's existence (as well as what motivates agnosticism, i.e., suspending judgment). So here are the questions:

• For people who believe that God exists, what reasons do, or would, they give to support their belief? A different question (how so?) is, What might cause people to believe in God?
• For people who believe that God does not exist, what reasons do, or would, they give to support their belief? A different question (how so?) is, What might cause people to believe there is not God?
• For people who have considered the question but neither believe nor disbelieve that God exists, what reasons do, or would, they give to support their belief? A different question (how so?) is, What might cause people to be agnostics?
  

We want to make lists of as many reasons as we can possibly think of. Try to be exhaustive. Anything you have heard or can imagine hearing is worth writing down.

The next question is whether which, if any, of these reasons are good reasons or not.

I asked JC to moderate and record.

For Monday:

Aquinas's 5 Ways; OPS due

For Wed:

Taylor and Hick on the Cosmological Argument; OPS due

Commentary on Rachels

1 TI: WORSHIP AND MORAL AUTONOMY.
AU: LOMBARDI,-JOSEPH-L
SO: Religious-Studies. JE 88; 24: 101-119
IS: 0034-4125
AB: JAMES RACHELS PRESENTED AN ARGUMENT FOR THE NECESSARY NONEXISTENCE OF GOD WHICH WAS CRITICIZED BY PHILIP QUINN AND ROBERT OAKES. REASONS ARE OFFERED FOR THINKING THAT QUINN'S RECONSTRUCTION MISREPRESENTS RACHELS'S VIEWS. IT IS ALSO ARGUED THAT THE ATTEMPTS OF QUINN AND OAKES TO EXCLUDE POSSIBLE INCOMPATIBILITY BETWEEN DIVINE OBEDIENCE AND MORAL AUTONOMY ARE NOT PERSUASIVE. FINALLY, A DIFFERENT REASON IS GIVEN FOR BELIEVING THAT RACHELS'S ARGUMENT IS UNSOUND. A BRIEF POSTSCRIPT DISCUSSES QUINN'S RECENT SUGGESTION THAT THE OBLIGATION ASSOCIATED WITH WORSHIP IS NOT A MORAL OBLIGATION BUT A "RELIGIOUS" ONE.
DE: AUTONOMY-; GOD-; RELIGION-; WORSHIP-
PS: QUINN,-P; RACHELS,-J
LA: ENGLISH
DT: Journal-Article
AN: 1163069
in The Philosopher's Index 1940-2007/06.

2 TI: KANTIAN AUTONOMY AND DIVINE COMMANDS.
AU: MURPHY,-JEFFRIE-G
SO: Faith-and-Philosophy. JL 87; 4: 276-281
IS: 0739-7046
AB: JAMES RACHELS HAS ARGUED THAT A MORALLY AUTONOMOUS PERSON (IN KANT'S SENSE) COULD NOT CONSISTENTLY ACCEPT THE AUTHORITY OF DIVINE COMMANDS. AGAINST RACHELS, THIS ESSAY ARGUES (A) THAT THE KANTIAN CONCEPT OF MORAL AUTONOMY IS TO BE ANALYZED IN TERMS OF AN AGENT'S RESPONSIVENESS TO THE BEST AVAILABLE MORAL REASONS AND (B) THAT IT IS SIMPLY QUESTION-BEGGING AGAINST DIVINE COMMAND THEORY TO ASSUME THAT SUCH COMMANDS COULD NOT COUNT AS THE BEST MORAL REASONS AVAILABLE TO AN AGENT.
DE: AUTONOMY-; COMMAND-; DIVINE-; ETHICS-; GOD-
PS: KANT,-IMMANUEL
LA: ENGLISH
DT: Journal-Article
AN: 1151390
in The Philosopher's Index 1940-2007/06.

3 TI: RELIGIOUS OBEDIENCE AND MORAL AUTONOMY.
AU: QUINN,-PHILIP-L
SO: Religious-Studies. S 75; 11: 265-281
IS: 0034-4125
AB: THE PURPOSE OF THIS PAPER IS TO EXPLORE THE RELATIONS BETWEEN MORAL AUTONOMY AND RELIGIOUS OBEDIENCE. AN ARGUMENT CONSTRUCTED BY JAMES RACHELS, WHICH PURPORTS TO SHOW THAT THEY ARE INCOMPATIBLE, IS PROVED TO BE UNSOUND. IT IS ARGUED THAT THERE ARE EPISTEMIC SITUATIONS IN WHICH IT WOULD BE REASONABLE TO BELIEVE THAT ONE HAD RECEIVED A DIVINE COMMAND, AND THE KANTIAN RESPONSE TO THE STORY OF ABRAHAM AND ISAAC IS CRITICIZED. TECHNICAL NOTIONS OF AUTONOMY AND OBEDIENCE, ACCORDING TO WHICH THEY ARE INCOMPATIBLE PROVIDED MORALITY DOES NOT DEPEND ON THE DIVINE WILL, ARE DEFINED, BUT IT IS SUGGESTED THAT AUTONOMY, SO DEFINED, IS NOT A SENSIBLE MORAL IDEAL.
DE: AUTONOMY-; GOD-; RELIGION-; WORSHIP-
PS: RACHELS,-J
LA: ENGLISH
DT: Journal-Article
AN: 1049540
in The Philosopher's Index 1940-2007/06.

4 TI: REPLY TO PROFESSOR RACHELS.
AU: OAKES,-ROBERT-A
SO: Religious-Studies. JE 72; 8: 165-167
IS: 0034-4125
AB: THIS PAPER CONSTITUTES A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR JAMES RACHELS' "GOD AND HUMAN ATTITUDES" WHICH APPEARED IN THE DECEMBER 1971 ISSUE OF "RELIGIOUS STUDIES", PP. 325-337. I ATTEMPT TO SHOW THAT RACHELS' PUTATIVE ONTOLOGICAL DISPROOF OF GOD FAILS INSOFAR AS THERE IS NO LOGICAL INCOMPATIBILITY BETWEEN THE AXIOLOGICAL PERFECTION OF GOD AND HUMAN MORAL AGENCY.
DE: EXISTENCE-; GOD-; RELIGION-
PS: RACHELS,-J
LA: ENGLISH
DT: Journal-Article
AN: 1037781
in The Philosopher's Index 1940-2007/06.

5 TI: GOD AND HUMAN ATTITUDES.
AU: RACHELS,-JAMES
SO: Religious-Studies.; 7: 325-338
IS: 0034-4125
DE: AUTONOMY-; GOD-; RELIGION-; WORSHIP-
LA: ENGLISH
DT: Journal-Article
AN: 1077625
in The Philosopher's Index 1940-2007/06.

For Wednesday

8. God and the Concept of Worship , James Rachels , p. 38 in Cahn’s Exploring Philosophy of Religion

Some additional articles on God & Forgiveness, with some abstracts

TI:	The Nature of God's Love and Forgiveness
		AU:	Drabkin,-Douglas
		SO:	Religious-Studies. Je 93; 29(2): 231-238
		IS:	0034-4125
		AB:	1) I suggest that God, a being good in the best possible combination of ways, loves us by promoting our true good -- the moral life -- while being disposed to feel joy when we are good, and sorrow when we are evil. I defend this view against Creel, who argues that God cannot suffer, since suffering is neither intrinsically good nor good in virtue of its consequences. 2) I argue, against Minas, that God will forgive us, by feeling joy on our account and ceasing to suffer, provided we repent and commit to becoming good. 3) I argue that emotional change is compatible with omniscience.
		DE:	CHRISTIANITY-; FORGIVENESS-; GOD-; LOVE-; RELIGION-
		LA:	English

TI:	God and Forgiveness
		AU:	Londey,-David
		SO:	Sophia-. 1992; 31(1-2): 101-109
		IS:	0038-1527
		DE:	EVIL-; FORGIVENESS-; GOD-; RELIGION-
		PS:	BRIEN,-A
		LA:	English
		DT:	Journal-Article
		AN:	1236736

	7	TI:	CAN GOD FORGIVE US OUR TRESPASSES?
		AU:	BRIEN,-ANDREW
		SO:	Sophia-. JL 89; 28: 35-42
		IS:	0038-1527
		AB:	IN HIS PAPER "CAN GOD FORGIVE US OUR TRESPASSES?" ("SOPHIA", 25, JULY 1986, 4-10), DAVID LONDEY ARGUES THAT IT IS LOGICALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR AN IDEAL MORAL AGENT (IMA) TO FORGIVE AND ACT RIGHTLY. IN MY PAPER I ARGUE THAT HIS ARGUMENT FAILS FOR AT LEAST TWO REASONS. FIRST, IT IS INVALID DUE TO EQUIVOCATION BETWEEN TYPES OF 'OUGHT' IN HIS ARGUMENT. SECOND, EVEN IF THE ARGUMENT WERE VALID, IT CANNOT GUARANTEE THE TRUTH OF THE CONCLUSION BECAUSE IT RESTS UPON LONDEY'S ACCOUNT OF FORGIVENESS, WHICH IS, ITSELF, FALSE. THE PAPER HAS THREE SECTIONS. IN THE FIRST SECTION I SET OUT THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN 'OUGHTS'. IN THE SECOND SECTION I CONSIDER THE VALIDITY OF THE ARGUMENT IN THE LIGHT OF THIS. IN THE THIRD SECTION I CONSIDER LONDEY'S ACCOUNT OF FORGIVENESS.
		DE:	AGENCY-; FORGIVENESS-; GOD-; MORALITY-; RELIGION-

9	TI:	CAN GOD FORGIVE?
		AU:	PATON,-MARGARET
		SO:	Modern-Theology. AP 88; 4: 225-233
		IS:	0266-7177
		DE:	DIVINE-; FORGIVENESS-; GOD-; RELIGION-
		LA:	ENGLISH
		DT:	Journal-Article
		AN:	1156918

TI:	CAN GOD FORGIVE US OUR TRESPASSES?
		AU:	LONDEY,-DAVID
		SO:	Sophia-. JL 86; 25: 4-10
		IS:	0038-1527
		AB:	A SHORT ANALYSIS IS GIVEN OF THE ACT OF FORGIVING, WHICH IS DISTINGUISHED FROM SHOWING MERCY. IT IS SHOWN THAT FORGIVING INVOLVES TOTAL REMISSION OF DESERVED PENALTIES, INCLUDING MORAL CENSURE. AN ARGUMENT IN SENECA ("DE CLEMENTIA", II,7) REJECTS FORGIVING AS WRONG BECAUSE THE FORGIVER OMITS WHAT HE OUGHT TO DO. ALTHOUGH THIS ARGUMENT DOES NOT HOLD FOR ORDINARY MORAL AGENTS, IT DOES HOLD FOR PERFECT MORAL AGENTS--WHENCE, A MORALLY PERFECT GOD CANNOT FORGIVE WRONGDOERS.
		DE:	FORGIVENESS-; GOD-; MERCY-; RELIGION-

I:	FORGIVENESS.
		AU:	HUGHES,-MARTIN
		SO:	Analysis-. MR 75; 35: 113-117
		IS:	0003-2638
		DE:	FORGIVENESS-; GOD-; RELIGION-
		PS:	GINGELL,-J
		LA:	ENGLISH
		DT:	Journal-Article
		AN:	1046965

	13	TI:	GOD AND FORGIVENESS.
		AU:	MINAS,-ANNE-C
		SO:	Philosophical-Quarterly. AP 75; 25: 138-150
		IS:	0031-8094
		AB:	I TRY TO SHOW HOW IT IS LOGICALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR GOD TO FORGIVE ANYONE, BECAUSE OF INCOMPATIBILITY BETWEEN THE CONCEPTS OF 'DIVINITY' AND 'FORGIVENESS'. I MAKE SOME FAIRLY STANDARD ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT 'DIVINITY' AND THEN FIND EIGHT OR NINE TYPES OF 'FORGIVENESS'. WITH EACH TYPE I TRY TO SHOW THAT IT'S NOT AN ACTION A DIVINE BEING CAN PERFORM.
		DE:	FORGIVENESS-; GOD-; PUNISHMENT-; RELIGION-; RESENTMENT-
		PS:	BUTLER

TI:	FORGIVENESS AND POWER.
		AU:	GINGELL,-JOHN
		SO:	Analysis-. JE 74; 34: 180-183
		IS:	0003-2638
		DE:	FORGIVENESS-; GOD-; POWER-; RELIGION-
		LA:	ENGLISH
		DT:	Journal-Article
		AN:	1043812