Here's some discussion I mentioned today; perhaps you'd like to take a look at it for a final paper.
"Sceptical Theism and Evidential Arguments from Evil" [I'm trying to find an electronic version]
Journal Australasian Journal of Philosophy
Issue Volume 81, Number 4/December 01, 2003
Michael J. Almeida, Graham Oppy
Sceptical theists--e.g., William Alston and Michael Bergmann--have claimed that considerations concerning human cognitive limitations are alone sufficient to undermine evidential arguments from evil. We argue that, if the considerations deployed by sceptical theists are sufficient to undermine evidential arguments from evil, then those considerations are also sufficient to undermine inferences that play a crucial role in ordinary moral reasoning. If cogent, our argument suffices to discredit sceptical theist responses to evidential arguments from evil.
“In Defense of Skeptical Theism: A Reply to Ameida and Oppy.” (with Michael Bergmann). Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2005): 241 – 51.
"Skeptical Theism and Moral Skepticism: A Reply to Almeida and Oppy," discussion note by Nick Trakakis & Yujin Nagasawa
Reply to Trakakis and Nagasawa
discussion note by Michael Almeida & Graham Oppy
University of Texas at San Antonio, USA & Monash University, Australia