Some literature on Hell from the Philosophers Index:
TI: The Injustice of Hell AU: Kershnar,-Stephen SO: International-Journal-for-Philosophy-of-Religion. O 2005; 58(2): 103-123 AB: This essay aims to establish two theses. First, hell is unjust. Second, God ought not (or perhaps cannot) impose hell on human beings. In support of these theses, Stephen Kershnar argues that human beings do not deserve hell because they either cannot cause an infinite amount of harm or are not responsible for doing so. Also, since humans don't have infinitely bad characters, hell can't be deserved on the basis of character. Since humans don't deserve hell, God may not (or perhaps cannot) impose unjust punishments and hence may not (or cannot) send or allow persons to go to hell. PY: 2005
In Database: The Philosopher's Index 1940-2006/12.
4 TI: Escaping Hell: Divine Motivation and the Problem of Hell AU: Buckareff,-Andrei-A; Plug,-Allen SO: Religious-Studies. Mr 05; 41(1): 39-54 AB: We argue that it is most rational for God, given God's character and policies, to adopt an open-door policy towards those in hell--making it possible for those in hell to escape. We argue that such a policy towards the residents of hell should issue from God's character and motivational states. In particular, God's parental love ought to motivate God to extend the provision for reconciliation with Him for an infinite amount of time. PY: 2005
In Database: The Philosopher's Index 1940-2006/12.
5 TI: The Problem of Hell--The Universalism of Thomas Talbott (in Polish) AU: Lukasiewicz,-Dariusz SO: Kwartalnik-Filozoficzny. 2004; 32(3): 75-91 AB: The paper presents Thomas Talbott's views on the existence of hell. Talbott argues that the existence of hell conceived as eternal never-ending suffering is impossible from the logical point of view. According to him the existence of an eternal hell is inconsistent with God's love and justice. Talbott, however, does not rule out the possibility that hell exists, but only as a transitory situation preceding universal salvation. PY: 2004
In Database: The Philosopher's Index 1940-2006/12.
6 TI: A Hell of a Dilemma: Rejoinder to Talbott AU: Walls,-Jerry-L SO: Religious-Studies. Je 04; 40(2): 225-227 AB: In this brief rejoinder to Talbott's reply, I argue that his clarifications pose a dilemma for him: he must either modify his account of unbearable misery, or give up his claim that all sinners must reach a point where they can resist God no farther. PY: 2004
In Database: The Philosopher's Index 1940-2006/12.
7 TI: Misery and Freedom: Reply to Walls AU: Talbott,-Thomas SO: Religious-Studies. Je 04; 40(2): 217-224 AB: In this brief reply to Walls's challenging critique, I try to do two things: first, clarify the most fundamental point on which I think Walls and I disagree, and second, argue that, as surprising as it may first appear, Walls's free-will theodicy of hell requires that God interfere with human freedom in inappropriate ways. PY: 2004
In Database: The Philosopher's Index 1940-2006/12.
8 TI: A Hell of a Choice: Reply to Talbott AU: Walls,-Jerry-L SO: Religious-Studies. Je 04; 40(2): 203-216 AB: In this article I respond to Thomas Talbott's criticisms of the view of hell I have defended. In particular, I argue that coherent sense can be made of the choice to be eternally separated from God. Moreover, Talbott does not successfully show how God can save everyone without overriding their freedom. Finally, I argue that there is no significant sense in which sinners defeat God or sin with impunity on the view I have defended. Talbott's case that universalism necessarily follows from God's perfect love and power then falls. PY: 2004
In Database: The Philosopher's Index 1940-2006/12.
9 TI: "Is Eternal Damnation Compatible with the Christian Concept of God?: No Hell" in Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion, Peterson, Michael L (ed), 278-287 AU: Talbott,-Thomas PB: Blackwell-Publishing : Malden MA, 2004 AB: Jerry Walls and Thomas Talbott both agree that God is perfectly loving and that he desires the salvation of all the persons he has created. But they disagree as to whether God's desire will be fulfilled. Walls argues that God has given human beings libertarian freedom and the opportunity to use it to accept or reject salvation. In so doing, God leaves open the possibility that some persons will freely and decisively reject him, a possibility which Jesus' own words lead us to believe will be actual. On the other side, Talbott contends that God's desire for the salvation of all will be fulfilled. He argues that it is not possible for one freely to reject God forever and that, even if it were, God's love would not permit anyone to do so.
11 TI: In Defense of Naive Universalism AU: Howard-Snyder,-Daniel SO: Faith-and-Philosophy. Jl 03; 20(3): 345-363 AB: Michael J. Murray defends the traditional doctrine of hell by arguing directly against its chief competitor, universalism. Universalism, says
TI: "Jonathan Edwards and the Doctrine of Hell" in Jonathan Edwards: Philosophical Theologian, Helm, Paul (ed), 13-26 AU: Wainwright,-William-J PB: Ashgate-Publishing : Aldershot, 2003 AB: Edwards attempts to show that (1) the eternal punishment of the wicked is a necessary consequence of God's desire to display his justice, majesty, and holiness, (2) contributes to the good of the whole system, and (3) is just. His endeavor is partly successful and partly not. For example, the propositions which support (1) are compatible with God's manifesting his holiness by simply annihilating rather than eternally punishing the wicked. Again, while Edwards's premises entail that any sin is infinitely heinous when considered objectively, they don't show that the sinner is infinitely heinous and so deserves infinite punishment. PY: 2003
In Database: The Philosopher's Index 1940-2006/12.
16 TI: "Jonathan Edwards on Hell" in Jonathan Edwards: Philosophical Theologian, Helm, Paul (ed), 1-11 AU: Kvanvig,-Jonathan-L PB: Ashgate-Publishing :
TI: Hell and Vagueness AU: Sider,-Theodore SO: Faith-and-Philosophy. Ja 02; 19(1): 58-68 AB: A certain traditional conception of the afterlife is binary. After death one proceeds either to heaven or hell. Heaven is very, very good; hell is very, very bad. There are no possibilities for the afterlife other than heaven and hell, and membership in heaven or hell is never indeterminate or a matter of degree. The problem with the binary conception is that it contradicts God's justice. God must employ some criterion to decide who goes to heaven and who goes to hell. No reasonable criterion would be sharp; any reasonable criterion will have borderline cases. But the binary conception of the afterlife allows for no corresponding fuzziness in how the dead are to be treated. Hell must therefore contain people who are nearly indiscernible in relevant respects from people in heaven. No just God would allow such a monstrously unfair thing.
TI: On the Problem of Hell AU: Cain,-James SO: Religious-Studies. S 02; 38(3): 355-362 AB: There is a conception of hell that holds that God punishes some people in a way that brings about endless suffering and unhappiness. An objection to this view holds that such punishment could not be just since it punishes finite sins with infinite suffering. In answer to this objection, it is shown that endless suffering, even intense suffering, is consistent with the suffering being finite. Another objection holds that such punishment is contrary to God's love. A possible response to this objection is developed.
TI: God Is Great, God Is Good: Medieval Conceptions of Divine Goodness and the Problem of Hell AU: Clark,-Kelly-James SO: Religious-Studies. Mr 01; 37(1): 15-31 AB: Eleonore Stump, accepting the medievals' axiology, ameliorates the doctrine of hell. However, I argue that her Dantean version of hell fails because not to be in certain circumstances is rationally preferable to continued existence. In addition, life under those conditions would result in frustration, not fulfillment, of one's second nature and would result in a progressive loss of being. Indeed, it seems more reasonable to reject the identity of being and goodness which both the medievals and Stump embrace or to accept being as a prima facie good that is defeasible in the face of eternal damnation. (edited) PY: 2001
In Database: The Philosopher's Index 1940-2006/12.
25 TI: A Craigian Theodicy of Hell AU: Seymour,-Charles SO: Faith-and-Philosophy. Ja 00; 17(1): 103-115 AB: Problem: if God has middle knowledge, he should actualize a world containing only persons whom he knows would freely choose heaven. Thus, there should be no hell. Craig offers an answer to this problem in his article "'No Other Name': a Middle Knowledge Perspective on the Exclusivity of Salvation Through Christ." Craig is mainly concerned to give a logically possible defense of hell, though he thinks his suggestion does not lack the sort of plausibility needed for a theodicy. I consider various objections to the latter assessment. My conclusion is that, although Craig's argument is implausible as a theodicy of conservative exclusivist soteriology, it is useful for less traditional ideas of hell. PY: 2000
TI: The Idea of Hell and the Classical Doctrine of God AU: Kronen,-John-D SO: Modern-Schoolman. N 99; 77(1): 13-34 AB: Two key features of the classical doctrine of hell (CDH) are that the sufferings of the damned are positively willed by God on them, and that these sufferings include certain pains which are not simply the necessary concomitants of being denied the beatific vision. In this paper I show that these two features of CDH contradict central tenets of the classical doctrine of God and that the arguments that have been traditionally given in support of the CDH are, in any case, weak. I conclude from this that, whatever doctrine of hell one adopts, it should not include these two central features of CDH.
I: Hell and the Goodness of God AU: Van-Holten,-Wilko SO: Religious-Studies. Mr 99; 35(1): 37-55 AB: In this paper I contribute to the ongoing debate on hell in three ways: (1) I distinguish between three questions that play a key role in any discussion of the doctrine of hell; (2) I argue positively for the need of a doctrine of hell for Christian theism; (3) after evaluating several theological positions, I argue that the doctrine of hell should be construed as intrinsically bound up with the Christian conviction that God is love and wants to live with human beings in a relationship of mutual love and fellowship. From this perspective on hell I provide some fresh criticisms on the positions of John Hick, Thomas Talbott, and Charles Seymour.
TI: On Choosing Hell AU: Seymour,-Charles SO: Religious-Studies. S 97; 33(3): 249-266 AB: Most contemporary philosophers who defend the compatibility of hell with the divine goodness do so by arguing that the damned freely choose hell. Thomas Talbott denies that such a choice is possible, on the grounds that God in his goodness would remove any 'ignorance, deception, or bondage to desire' which would motivate a person to choose eternal misery. My strategy is to turn the tables on Talbott and ask why God would not remove the motives we have for any sin whatsoever. I argue that two plausible answers to this question also show why God would not remove our motives for choosing hell.
38 TI: The Problem of Hell AU: Kvanvig,-Jonathan-L PB: Oxford-Univ-Pr :
TI: Intolerable But Moral? Thinking About Hell AU: Jensen,-Paul-T SO: Faith-and-Philosophy. Ap 93; 10(2): 235-241 AB: Thomas Talbott's recent argument for Hell's nonexistence is a sophisticated version of hard universalism. I suggest some reasons to question his argument and to accept the logical and moral possibility that some humans will not be saved.
TI: Craig on the Possibility of Eternal Damnation AU: Talbott,-Thomas SO: Religious-Studies. D 92; 28(4): 495-510 AB: In two papers, one a critique of two papers of mine, William Lane Craig has sought to put the Free Will Defense in the service of the traditional doctrine of hell; and in my rejoinder, I argue that Craig's defense of the traditional doctrine is unsuccessful. I consider several propositions that Craig claims are logically possible, and with respect to each of them I defend one of two claims. Either the proposition is not really possible, or it does not entail the traditional doctrine. Hence, Craig fails to demonstrate even the possibility of the traditional doctrine. PY: 1992
In Database: The Philosopher's Index 1940-2006/12.
41 TI: The Doctrine of Hell and Moral Philosophy AU: Yandell,-Keith-E SO: Religious-Studies. Mr 92; 28(1): 75-90
TI: Divine Omniscience and the Soteriological Problem of Evil: Is the Type of Knowledge God Possesses Relevant? AU: Basinger,-David SO: Religious-Studies. Mr 92; 28(1): 1-18 AB: The "soteriological" problem of evil is concerned with the traditional theistic belief that many will spend eternity in hell. If God is all-loving, he wants no one in hell, and if God is all powerful, he can bring it about that no one will be in hell. Thus, must we not conclude that the traditional concept of God cannot be reconciled with eternal damnation? I argue that, while responses to this challenge may well differ significantly as a function of the model of divine omniscience affirmed, no such model offers a response that is clearly superior to the others.
TI: The Doctrine of Everlasting Punishment. AU: TALBOTT,-THOMAS SO: Faith-and-Philosophy. Ja 90; 7(1): 19-42 AB: I argue that, although theism in general is consistent, many of the popular forms, specifically those that include the traditional doctrine of hell, are implicitly self-contradictory. After examining three varieties of theism, each of which involves, I contend, a logical impossibility of one kind or another, I conclude that nothing short of an explicit universalism--that is, nothing short of the view that God will eventually reconcile all persons to himself--is consistent with other doctrines essential to Christian theism.
56 TI: HELL AND THE GOD OF JUSTICE. AU: ADAMS,-MARILYN-MCCORD SO: Religious-Studies. D 75; 11: 433-447
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