"Sceptical Theism and Evidential Arguments from Evil"
Journal Australasian Journal of Philosophy
Issue Volume 81, Number 4/December 01, 2003
Michael J. Almeida, Graham Oppy
Abstract: Sceptical theists--e.g., William Alston and Michael Bergmann--have claimed that considerations concerning human cognitive limitations are alone sufficient to undermine evidential arguments from evil. We argue that, if the considerations deployed by sceptical theists are sufficient to undermine evidential arguments from evil, then those considerations are also sufficient to undermine inferences that play a crucial role in ordinary moral reasoning. If cogent, our argument suffices to discredit sceptical theist responses to evidential arguments from evil.
“In Defense of Skeptical Theism: A Reply to Ameida and Oppy.” (with Michael Bergmann). Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2005): 241 – 51.
"Skeptical Theism and Moral Skepticism: A Reply to Almeida and Oppy," discussion note by Nick Trakakis & Yujin Nagasawa
Reply to Trakakis and Nagasawa
discussion note by Michael Almeida & Graham Oppy
University of Texas at San Antonio, USA & Monash University, Australia
Richard Feldman, "Clifford’s Principle and James’s Options " (you will need to read the Williams James essay in Clark also).
Richard Feldman, Reasonable Religious Disagreements (pdf) (July 8, 2004). (You should find a/the article by Plantinga where he discusses this issue .. this probably isn't that hard to find, i.e., something by Plantinga on religious diversity). This paper will appear in volume with a title something like “Philosophers Without God.” The volume is intended for a wider audience than just academic philosophers. It is supposed to be at least to some extent a personal statement.
Daniel Howard-Snyder, "The Argument from Divine Hiddenness," Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 1996
- Woodruff Library of the Atlanta University Center
- Woodruff Library: The Philosophers Index
- Woodruff Library: Other Databases